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Introduction
The last decades have witnessed an enormous growth in foreign direct investment (FDI) around the world (UNCTAD 2004) . This also holds true for Germany which is one of the largest host economies for inward FDI among developed countries (Jost 2011) .
Comparing the stocks of inward FDI for the year 2009, Germany was ranked position four, after the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. It experienced a dramatic growth in the inward FDI stock in the last two decades. The stock rose from US$ 120 billion in the year 1990 to US$ 937 billion in the year 2009. Foreign-owned firms in nonfinancial industries now account for about 20 percent of total gross value added and employ more than 10 percent of all workers in those industries.
Corporate globalization is usually explained by the superior products and production processes of multinational companies (MNCs) to which other firms have no access (Helpman 2006 , Markusen 1995 . However, corporate globalization has also given rise to concerns about the threats to national institutions and regulatory regimes. Foreign multinational firms may bring different firm strategies to the host country and may face difficulties in adjusting to the institutional framework of the host country so that their activities can involve tensions with that framework (Kostova and Roth 2002) .
Our study provides an econometric analysis of those tensions for works councils in Germany. We examine whether or not foreign ownership has an influence on the cooperation between works councils and managers. This is particular interesting as German works councils have acquired extensive powers compared to works councils in other European countries. They provide a highly developed mechanism for codetermination. German works councils have attracted considerable attention as an 2 institution that fosters trust within firms through its information sharing and contract enforcement role (Freeman and Lazear 1995 , Kaufman and Levine 2000 , Smith 1991 ). 1 Both the workforce and the employer may benefit from this trust-building role of works councils. From the workers' viewpoint, a works council reduces the risk that management unilaterally takes actions without considering their interests. From the management's viewpoint, a council fosters workers' willingness to provide effort and to be loyal to the firm. The potential value of high-trust relationships with employees can induce management to cooperate with the works council and to involve it in a wide range of decisions. However, at issue is whether this role of works councils applies generally to all firms or whether it depends on the type of ownership of the firm.
From a theoretical point of view, the influence of foreign ownership on cooperative relationships between managers and works councils is ambiguous. On the one hand, managers and works councils in foreign-owned firms might cooperate at least just as managers and works councils in domestic-owned firms. MNCs tend to implement unified management practices that follow company-wide standards. Adopting the practices of a foreign parent company is very likely to entail a high degree of uncertainty and ambiguity for the workers of the local subsidiary. The involvement of a works council has potentially a high commitment value to management if the council is able to ensure that the foreign parent company behaves in accordance with its explicit and implicit commitments and does not take excessive advantage of the local subsidiary.
On the other hand, several reasons suggest that it is difficult for management and works council to cooperate when the firm is owned by a foreign parent company. A high degree of information asymmetry makes it less likely that the works council can play an 3 effective information sharing role in a foreign-owned firm. While the works council of the local firm has no access to the information possessed by the parent company's managers, the managers of the foreign parent company lack sufficient information about the local conditions of the firm. This can result in increased distrust and antagonism. The council may not support the implementation of the practices of the foreign parent company if it has only limited access to relevant information. The foreign parent company's managers in turn may view codetermination rather as an obstacle and induce the managers of the local subsidiary to bypass the council in order to unilaterally implement the practices. This tendency is reinforced if the MNC is more volatile and the foreign parent company's managers have little interest in long-term cooperation with the works council. The threat to transfer production abroad can effectively weaken the power of the council to cooperatively build high-trust relationships and to realize mutual gains for the firm and the employees. In this situation, the council may use its remaining power to actively resist the implementation of the policy of the foreign parent company.
Our empirical analysis uses firm data conducted by Great Place to Work This study contributes in several ways to the literature. As emphasized by Collings (2008) , research on MNCs and industrial relations is a road less travelled. This 4 also holds true for Germany. While there is a remarkably increasing number of econometric analyses on German works councils, only very few papers consider the role foreign ownership plays in the functioning of works councils. 2 Addison et al. (2003) and Schmitt (2003) examine whether or not workers in foreign-owned firms are more likely to adopt a works council. They find that foreign-owned firms are more likely to have a works council than domestic-owned firms. However, while investigating the link between foreign ownership and works council incidence deserves interest in its own right, this does tell us little about potential tensions. Workers may see foreign owners as entailing a greater risk and uncertainty and, hence, adopt a works council even though a council in foreign-owned firms can only provide a minimum level of protection and aggravates conflicts with the management. Our findings fit this hypothesis. We can confirm a positive association between foreign ownership and works council incidence with our data and, moreover, show that foreign ownership reduces the likelihood of a cooperative relationship between management and works council.
Studies by Heywood and Jirjahn (2013) and Jirjahn and Mueller (2013) examine the interaction effect of foreign ownership and works councils on firm performance and practices to increase firm performance. Both studies find a negative interaction effect suggesting that works councils play a positive role in firm performance among domesticowned firms but not among foreign-owned firms. While this negative interaction effect is consistent with the hypothesis of increased conflict in firms with foreign ownership, it leaves room for alternative interpretations. The negative interaction might simply reflect that foreign ownership and codetermination act as substitutes. Either foreign owners or works councils could increase performance, but this influence might not be additive. Our 5 analysis provides direct evidence of reduced cooperation between management and works council in foreign-owned firms. Thus, it helps interpret the negative interaction effect found by the two previous studies. 3 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section, the institutional framework is described. The third section presents our background discussion. The fourth section describes the data and variables. The estimates are presented in the fifth section. The sixth section concludes.
Institutional Framework
Industrial relations in Germany are characterized by a dual structure of employee representation with both unions and works councils (Keller 2004 While the council does not have the right to strike, the employer must not obstruct its activities. Works council and employer shall collaborate with the serious attempt to reach an agreement and to set aside differences. If they fail to reach an agreement, they may appeal to an internal arbitration board or to the labor court. Moreover, the WCA does not allow wage negotiations. The aim is to restrict distributional conflicts on the establishment level. Rather works councils are designed to increase joint establishment surplus. Works council and employer are required by law to cooperate "in a spirit of mutual trust . . . for the good of the employees and of the establishment."
Background Discussion
Cooperation between Works Council and Management
The existence of information asymmetries and commitment problems is one explanation as to why works councils may play the intended role in fostering trustful industrial relations within establishments. Employees will withhold loyalty and effort when an employer cannot credibly commit to take into account their interests. There is a variety of Theory suggests that worker representation can be a way to protect the interests of the workforce (Freeman and Lazear 1995 , Kaufman and Levine 2000 , Smith 1991 ). The information rights of a works council help reduce information asymmetries. This makes it easier to verify the employer's claims. Moreover, the veto and coequal participation rights of the council help avoid that the employer unilaterally takes actions without considering workers' interests. This in turn fosters workers' willingness to provide effort and to be loyal to the firm. Altogether, the unique institutional design of works councils suggests that they have the potential to realize mutual gains for employees and employers.
However, while the argument that a council helps in building trust by mitigating the employer's commitment problems fits with the intention of the WCA, the functioning of codetermination is not completely predetermined by the letter of the law and can vary dramatically depending on the circumstances. Case studies (Frege 2002) and recent econometric examinations , Nienhueser 2009 , 8 Pfeifer 2011 , 2013 show that there is a wide range of industrial relations regimes characterized by different interactions of management and works council. In some firms, works council and management are indeed able to build cooperative and trustful relationships. Managers encourage the works council to participate in a wide range of decisions and to play a co-managerial role. The council, in turn, takes responsibility for productivity and economic success of the firm (Mueller-Jentsch 1995).
Yet, in other firms, the works council has extremely adversarial relationships with
management. An aggravation of conflicts may emerge in various situations. One scenario is that the council uses its codetermination rights not for increasing joint firm surplus but rather for rent-seeking activities . A council may use its codetermination rights on social and personnel matters to obtain employer concessions even on issues where it has no legal powers. The council may negotiate higher wages and less productive work practices that require lower effort by the workers.
A second possible scenario is that the owners or managers of the firm are not interested in long-term cooperation with the workforce (Jirjahn 2003, Jirjahn and Smith 2006) . They may rather prefer to maximize short-term profitability by reneging on implicit contracts with the employees. In this case, management may spend resources in isolating and weakening the works council instead of investing those resources in performance-enhancing projects. The council may try to act as a countervailing power in order to protect employee interests. However, the likely outcome is a lot of time spent in adversarial bargaining.
Finally, despite of the information rights of the works council, there can be situations in which serious information asymmetries remain (Jirjahn et al. 2011, Kennan 9 and Wilson 1993). Management may still have private information on predictions of demand and production, or on opportunities to redeploy capital in other locations and to substitute capital for labor. In this case, a works council is very likely to demand extensive consultations with management and to enter conflictual negotiations in order to obtain credible information. Management in turn may try to avoid involving the council if it fears that the involvement of the council results in delayed decisions. Thus, if a works council is not able to substantially reduce information asymmetries, codetermination may aggravate distrust and conflict.
The heterogeneity in works council-management relationships gives rise to the question as to which factors influence whether or not works council and management are able to build a cooperative relationship. We address this question by examining the role of foreign owners.
The Role of Foreign Owners
The management practices of foreign-owned firms differ (to a greater or lesser extent) from those of domestic-owned firms (Bloom and Van Reenen 2010 , Doeringer et al. 1998 , Freeman et al. 2008 , Heywood and Jirjahn 2013 , Poutsma et al. 2006 , Walsh 2001 ). 5 The existence of MNCs is often explained by their superior products or production processes to which other firms have no access (Helpman 2006 , Markusen 1995 . Specific management practices may be one source of this advantage, and even when not, the unique products and production processes of a MNC may be a source of competitive advantage only if the managers and employees of its subsidiaries undertake complementary efforts and human capital investments. Practices such as performance management and variable pay provide corresponding incentives. These practices may be seen by the managers of the parent company as specifically important to the extent that diverse workforces and diverse environments in the various host countries make coordination and agency problems in the subsidiaries more severe. Hence, the managers of the parent company may prefer to implement unified management practices in the subsidiaries that follow company-wide standards. As emphasized by Kostova and Roth (2002) , this can potentially involve tensions with the cultural and institutional context of the respective host country. At issue is whether or not this also holds true for codetermination in Germany.
Adopting the management practices of the foreign parent company entails a high degree of uncertainty and ambiguity for the employees of the local subsidiary (Scheve and Slaughter 2004) . Change requires renewed effort. Moreover, employees may suspect that they will lose their jobs due to competence-destroying change. Hence, they should have an increased desire for representation in order to protect their interests. This is confirmed by Addison et al. (2003) and Schmitt (2003) . They find that works councils are more likely to be present in foreign-owned establishments.
However, a positive link between foreign ownership and works council incidence tells us little about the quality of industrial relations in foreign-owned firms. On the one hand, managers and works councils in foreign-owned firms might cooperate at least just as managers and works councils in domestic-owned firms. Given that foreign ownership entails a high degree of risk to workers, the involvement of a works council has potentially a high commitment value. To discourage employees from withholding effort and resisting change, the managers of the foreign-owned firm might have a high interest in cooperating with the works council. On the other hand, the employees of the foreign-owned firm may adopt a works council to ensure some (minimum) protection even though the council is not able to play a co-managerial role and aggravates conflicts with management. Indeed, several reasons suggest that foreign ownership reduces the chance that management and works council cooperate.
One reason is that a high degree of information asymmetry in a foreign-owned firm makes it difficult for the works council to play an effective information sharing role. The managers of the foreign parent company may even generally not value local solutions that modify the common practices of the MNC. They may rather prefer to harmonize management practices across countries. Hence, as suggested by case study evidence, they exert pressure on the local managers to unilaterally implement unified management practices that follow company-wide standards (Tempel et al. 2006) . In response to this pressure, the local managers take actions to bypass the works council (Royle 1998) . This destroys trust and cooperation. In such a situation, the works council views the management practices of the MNC as more of a threat. As a consequence, the council acts as a countervailing power and tries to resist the implementation of those practices.
The foreign owner's incentive to make and implement decisions unilaterally may be reinforced to the extent foreign ownership inherently weakens the bargaining strength of the works council. If the foreign MNC maintains capacity to produce the same good in different national markets, the parent company's managers can more easily threaten to transfer production abroad (Caves 1996 , Fabbri et al. 2003 , Slaughter 2007 ). This limits the council's ability to shape policy and to play a trust-building role. 7 If the works council cannot effectively increase joint firm surplus, it may use its remaining bargaining power to specialize in rent seeking activities. Indeed, Gaston (2002) Finally, the 'varieties of capitalism approach' suggests that codetermination requires patient capital to cooperatively realize long-term mutual gains for investors and employees (Hall and Soskice 2001 ). Yet, foreign owners appear to be more volatile than domestic owners. A series of international studies show that foreign ownership is 13 associated with an increased probability of firm closure (Bernard and Sjoeholm 2003 , Goerg and Strobl 2003 , Harris 2009 , Wagner and Weche Geluebcke 2011 , higher levels of outsourcing (Girma and Goerg 2004) , and a faster adjustment of employment (Fabbri et al. 2003 , Navaretti et al. 2003 . 8 There is even evidence that firms with foreign ownership face pressure to maximize short-term profit (Dill et al. 2013, Liljeblom and Vaihekoski 2010) . These findings indicate that foreign-owned firms have a shorter time horizon implying that management may have little interest in long-term cooperation with the works council.
Data and Variables
Data Set
Our empirical investigation uses representative firm data collected by Great Place to The 339 firms are almost evenly spread across the different industries in Germany (Berger et al. 2011) . For our empirical analysis we exclude the public sector and nonprofit organizations. After eliminating observations for which full information is not available, the investigation is based on data from 213 firms.
Industrial Relations Regimes
The survey provides information on the incidence of a works council and on the 14 relationship the works council has with the management. Table 1 We use this information to define two dependent variables. The first variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a works council is present in the firm. It is equal to 0 if no council is present. Previous studies have found that foreign-owned firms are more likely to have a works council , Schmitt 2003 . We estimate the determinants of works council incidence to check if we can confirm this finding also with our data.
However, as emphasized, examining the link between foreign ownership and works council incidence provides no information on the implications foreign ownership has for the quality of industrial relations. Thus, for those establishments having a works council, we define a second dependent variable capturing the quality of industrial relations within the firm. It is a dummy equal to 1 if management views its relationship with the works council as being based on cooperation and partnership. It is equal to 0 otherwise. (Behrens 2009 ). Hence, unions should support the implementation of works councils. A union can provide expertise so that it is easier for workers to implement a works council. Moreover, the WCA provides that a union which has at least one member in the establishment can initiate the introduction of a works council. Centralized collective bargaining may also influence the relationship between works council and management. It reduces distributional conflicts on the firm level, allowing the council to play a more productive role (Huebler and Jirjahn 2003) . This suggests that collective bargaining coverage should have a positive influence on works council-management cooperation.
Explanatory Variables
Furthermore, we include several variables for general establishment characteristics. Previous research has shown that firm size and firm age are positively associated with the incidence of a works council (e.g., Addison et al. 2003) . Particularly, firm size may also play a role in the relationship between works council and management. Works councils may mitigate transaction costs in larger firms where the need for communication is likely to be higher. Thus, in larger firms, the benefits of a works council to the employer and the workforce should be greater. This should increase the probability that management and works council cooperate. Moreover, 8 industry dummies are included to control for the nature of the production process.
In order to examine whether or not monetary incentives for managers influence the incidence of a council or the quality of industrial relations, we control for managerial share ownership and the average share of performance-related pay in managers' total compensation. The firm's market strategy is captured by variables for innovativeness and quality orientation. A strategy based on innovation or product quality should increase management's incentive to cooperate with the works council. If the works council improves the information flow within the firm, this may provide managers with ideas about the potential for innovations and quality improvements Smith 2006, Smith 1994) . Codetermination may also play a role in motivating employees to develop valuable innovations and quality improvements. Moreover, the legal form of the firm is captured by dummy variables for a limited company and a stock corporation. If owners are protected by limited liability, they may induce management to undertake risky projects (Harhoff et al. 1998 ). This in turn may increase workers' desire for representation. Finally, we include a dummy equal to 1 if management feels that product market competition is high. On the one hand, a council may be specifically important for building trust and loyalty in firms that face high competitive pressure (Jirjahn 2009 (Jirjahn , 2010 . On the other hand, this is not likely to occur without conflict. Table 3 provides the basic regression results. Column (1) shows the estimates of the determinants of works council incidence. For those firms having a works council, column (2) presents the results on the determinants of a cooperative relationship between management and works council. As the dependent variables are dichotomous, the probit procedure is used. Firm size emerges as a significantly positive determinant of both the incidence of a works council and works council-management cooperation. Firm age, collective bargaining coverage, and innovativeness are significantly positive covariates of works council incidence.
Results
Initial Probit Regressions
Most importantly in our context, the variable for a foreign-owned subsidiary plays a significant role in both the incidence of a works council and the industrial relations climate. Foreign ownership is associated with a higher probability of works council incidence and a lower probability of a cooperative works council-management relation.
The variable for a domestic-owned subsidiary does not emerge as significant determinant.
This suggests that the influence on industrial relations is not a general phenomenon of subsidiary companies, but a specific phenomenon of foreign-owned subsidiary companies. The estimated magnitude of the influence of foreign ownership is quite substantial. Foreign-owned firms have a 26 percent higher probability that a works council is present. They have a 54 percent lower probability that the relationship between works council and management is based on cooperation and partnership.
Our finding of a positive link between foreign ownership and works council incidence confirms the results of previous studies. This link may be explained by a high degree of uncertainty and ambiguity for the employee of a foreign-owned firm. This uncertainty and ambiguity increases workers' desire for a representation in order to protect their interests. However, the negative link between foreign ownership and works council-management cooperation suggests that works councils in foreign-owned firms do not play the trust-building role they play in domestic-owned firms. A high degree of opacity and the foreign owners' propensity to unilaterally implement unified management practices complicate negotiations and aggravate conflicts between works council and local management. This tendency is reinforced if the foreign owners are more volatile and the threat to transfer production abroad weakens the council's power to play a productive role.
Bivariate Probit Regression with Sample Selection
Estimation (2) in Table 2 is based on a truncated sample of firms that have a works council. If there are unobserved factors influencing both the incidence of the works council and the works council-management relationship, the estimation may suffer from a sample selection bias. We use a bivariate probit model with sample selection to account for the potential bias introduced by the truncated sample (Van de Ven and Van Pragg 1981) . The determinants of works council incidence and the determinants of works council-management cooperation are jointly estimated by maximum likelihood. We achieve identification by excluding insignificant variables from the cooperation equation. Table 4 presents the results. The model provides no indication of a sample selection bias. A Wald test does not reject the null hypothesis of independent equations and the correlation between the error terms of the incidence and the cooperation equation is statistically insignificant. Most importantly, the model confirms the basic pattern of results. Foreign ownership is positively associated with works council incidence and negatively associated with works council-management cooperation.
Multinomial Probit Regression
As a further check of robustness we define a new dependent variable y that combines the information on the incidence of a works council and the quality of industrial relations: y = 0 if no works council is present; y = 1 if a works council is present and the relationship between works council and management is not based on cooperation and partnership; y = 2 if a works council is present and the relationship between works council and management is based on cooperation and partnership. We use the multinomial probit model as estimation method. The multinomial probit model generalizes the standard probit model by allowing more than two categorical, unordered outcomes. Table 5 provides the estimates. Column (1) shows the results on the determinants of the incidence of a works council that has no cooperative relationship with the management. Column (2) presents the findings on determinants of the incidence of a works council that has a cooperative relationship with the management. The reference group consists of firms that have no works council. Firm size is a positive determinant of both works council incidence not coupled with cooperation and works council incidence coupled with cooperation with the influence on latter industrial relations regime being stronger. Firm age is positively associated with the incidence of a council that has no cooperative relationship with management. Innovativeness and collective bargaining coverage are positive covariates of the incidence of a council that has a cooperative relationship with management.
Most importantly, foreign ownership is a positive determinant of the incidence of 20 a works council that has no cooperative relationship with management. This result fits our previous finding that foreign ownership increases the probability of works council incidence and decreases the probability of works council-management cooperation.
However, in the multinomial probit estimation the variable for domestic-owned subsidiaries for the first time emerges as a significant determinant. Domestic-owned subsidiaries are also more likely to have a works council that has no cooperative relationship with management. This indicates that managers and works councils of subsidiaries in general may have to some extent difficulties in building a trustful relationship. Nonetheless, the estimated magnitudes show that these difficulties are more severe in foreign-owned subsidiaries. Domestic-owned subsidiaries have a 38 percentage point higher probability that a works council is present and no cooperation between works council and management emerges. By contrast, that probability is 66 percentage points higher in foreign-owned subsidiaries. Thus, also the multinomial probit regression provides evidence that foreign ownership involves specific tensions with the German system of codetermination.
Conclusions
The consequences of globalization are a highly controversial issue. Our study provides an examination of these consequences for works councils in Germany. Previous research has
shown that works councils have the potential to improve both the quality of working life and economic performance. However, whether or not a works council can in fact increase joint firm surplus depends on cooperative relationships with management. Our estimates
show that foreign ownership reduces the chance that the relationship between works council and management is characterized by cooperation and partnership. This finding 21 conforms to the notion that the activities of foreign MNCs entail tensions with institutional framework of the host country. Interestingly, despite the negative influence on works council-management cooperation, foreign ownership is associated with a higher probability that a works council is present in the firm. To the extent foreign ownership involves a greater uncertainty and ambiguity for the workforce, employees may adopt a works council even though a council in a foreign-owned firm may aggravate conflicts with management and may provide only some minimum protection.
On a broader scale, our study contributes to the ongoing discussion on the erosion of industrial relations institutions in Germany. That discussion largely focuses on the declining trend in collective bargaining and works council coverage (e.g., Addison et al. 2010 ). Our study suggests that the discussion should also take into account the quality of industrial relations. If we would have considered only the link between foreign ownership and works council incidence, we would have concluded that foreign ownership does not contribute to the erosion of codetermination in Germany but even works against the process of erosion. Considering the quality of industrial relations yields a completely different picture of the role of foreign ownership. Foreign ownership contributes to the erosion of codetermination by reducing the chance of works council-management cooperation. Works councils may be more likely to be present in foreign-owned firms.
Yet, in foreign-owned firms, they do not play the trust-building and co-managerial role they often play in domestic-owned firms.
We recognize the need for continued research within the theme. Future research might fruitfully examine the dynamics of the interaction between foreign ownership and codetermination. The table shows the estimated coefficients. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***Statistically significant at the 1% level; **at the 5% level; *at the 10% level. Marginal effects are in square brackets. Marginal effects of dummy variables are evaluated for a discrete change from 0 to 1. The marginal effects of foreign-owned and domestic-owned subsidiaries are changes in probability compared to the reference group of domestic-owned firms that are no subsidiaries. The table shows the estimated coefficients. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***Statistically significant at the 1% level; **at the 5% level; *at the 10% level. Marginal effects are in square brackets. Marginal effects of dummy variables are evaluated for a discrete change from 0 to 1. The marginal effects of foreign-owned and domestic-owned subsidiaries are changes in probability compared to the reference group of domestic-owned firms that are no subsidiaries. 
